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Abstract
We study the problem of finding personalized reserve prices for unit-demand buyers in multi-
unit eager VCG auctions with correlated buyers. The input to this problem is a dataset of
submitted bids of n buyers in a set of auctions. The goal is to find a vector of reserve prices,
one for each buyer, that maximizes the total revenue across all auctions.
Roughgarden and Wang (2016) showed that this problem is APX-hard but admits a greedy
1/2-approximation algorithm. Later, Derakhshan, Golrezai, and Paes Leme (2019) gave an LP-
based algorithm achieving a 0.68-approximation for the (important) special case of the problem
with a single-item, thereby beating greedy. We show in this paper that the algorithm of Der-
akhshan et al. in fact does not beat greedy for the general multi-item problem. This raises the
question of whether or not the general problem admits a better-than-1/2 approximation.
In this paper, we answer this question in the affirmative and provide a polynomial-time
algorithm with a significantly better approximation-factor of 0.63. Our solution is based on a
novel linear programming formulation, for which we propose two different rounding schemes. We
prove that the best of these two and the no-reserve case (all-zero vector) is a 0.63-approximation.
∗Majority of the research was conducted while the author was an Intern at Microsoft Research NYC.
†Majority of the research was conducted while the author was a Principal Researcher at Microsoft Research NYC.
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1 Introduction
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, while “lovely” in theory [AM+06], is often criticized
for not having a good performance guarantee when it comes to revenue maximization. Hartline
and Roughgarden [HR09] approach this shortcoming by optimizing reserve prices, the minimum
prices that the seller is willing to sell each item to each buyer. According to a number of theoretical
and empirical studies [HR09, OS11, BGL+18, EOS07], personalized reserve prices (i.e., one custom
reserve price for each buyer) can significantly improve revenue. In particular, personalized reserves
can lead to approximately optimal revenue in quite general settings [HR09]. This has led to several
studies computing an optimal vector of reserve prices [BGL+18, RW16, PLPV16, DGL19]. The
study of VCG-like mechanisms for revenue optimization is closely aligned with a broader agenda of
simple vs. optimal mechanisms [GLMN17, CLMN14, PLPV16, AB18, BFM12, BGL+18, DRY15],
and in fact has been one of the starting points for this agenda [HR09].
1.1 Our Scope and Main Result
We focus on the eager version of VCG auctions. 1 Consider a multi-unit auction with unit-demand
buyers: that is, k identical units are available, and each buyer is interested in obtaining only one
unit. The auctioneer announces a reserve price rb for each buyer b and then buyers place their
bids. We run a VCG auction among the buyers that clear their reserve price (i.e., their bid equals
or exceeds their reserve price), and the winners pay the maximum of their own reserve price and
their VCG payment. That is, let S be the set of buyers who clear their reserve prices. The first k
buyers in S with the highest bids win. Each winning buyer pays the maximum of his/her reserve
price and the (k + 1)-th highest bid.
We adopt a standard data-driven model for computing reserve prices [RW16, PLPV16]: given a
history of buyers’ bids over multiple runs of the auction, we compute a reserve price for each buyer
to maximize the total revenue attained over the same dataset. An important property of this model
is that it does not impose essentially any restrictions on the bid distributions. In particular, buyers’
private values can be correlated, in contrast with other models [BGL+18, CLMN14, DRY15, HR09]
that assume independence. Moreover, any approximation for the data-driven model can also be used
in a black-box reduction of Morgenstern and Roughgarden [MR15] to approximate the Bayesian
Optimization and Batch Learning versions of the problem with (almost) the same approximation-
factor.2
In the data driven model, this problem was first studied by Roughgarden and Wang [RW16], who
showed that it is APX-hard3 and gave a 1/2 approximate greedy solution. Later, for the (important)
special case of k = 1 items, Derakhshan et al. [DGL19] showed that the approximation factor can
be improved to 0.68 thereby beating the greedy solution. In Section 6, we provide an example
proving that the algorithm of Derakhshan et al. [DGL19] in fact does not beat 1/2-approximation
for the general multi-item problem. This naturally raises the question:
Is there a polynomial time algorithm beating 1/2-approximation in the general case?
In this work, we answer this question in the affirmative and in fact achieve a significantly better
approximation ratio of 0.63 for any k (not necessarily constant).
1An alternative, called lazy VCG [DRY15], first forms a set of potential winners using a VCG auction, then
removes buyers whose bids don’t clear their reserve. The eager version is often superior both in theory and in
practice [PLPV16].
2In Bayesian Optimization, the buyers’ private value distributions are independent and known to the algorithm.
In Batch Learning, these distributions are unknown, and we only have access to samples drawn from them.
3NP-hard to approximate better a fixed constant factor.
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Main Result (Formalized in Theorem 1). Consider the data-driven model for eager VCG
auctions. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm for computing personalized reserve prices
which achieves a 0.63-approximation in expected revenue. That is, given a dataset of bids in a
set of auctions A, the algorithm outputs a vector of reserve prices ro such that the total revenue
obtained from running the eager VCG mechanism on A using reserve prices ro is at least a 0.63
fraction of that of any other vector of reserve prices.
1.2 Our Techniques
Our algorithm consists of two main parts. First, we design a polynomial-size Integer Linear Pro-
gram (ILP) to describe the optimal solution. By removing the integrality constraints, we obtain
a polynomial-size LP, which gives us a fractional solution. The second part is LP-rounding. Us-
ing the optimal solution of the LP, we construct two different integral solutions. We then show
that the best of three vectors: these two solutions and the all-zero vector of reserve prices, is a
0.63-approximation.
To write the LP, we first need a polynomial-size representation of the solution space in which
the revenue can be computed using a linear function. The natural representations (e.g., a vector of
reserve prices, or a reserve price per buyer) fail as they result in either an exponential-size solution
space or a nonlinear revenue function. We come up with an alternative concise representation,
based on the following observation: to compute the revenue of an auction, we do not need to know
the reserve prices of all the buyers. Rather, it suffices to only know the reserve prices of the winners
and the VCG payment, which is the (k + 1)-th highest cleared bid. The buyer who has this bid is
called the supporting buyer. We represent a solution based on its outcomes in different auctions,
where the “outcome” specifies who are the winners and who is the supporting buyer, and what
are their respective reserve prices. The revenue from each auction can be computed using a linear
function based on its outcome; therefore, the overall revenue can also be written as a linear function
which is sum of the revenue across all of these auctions.
Derakhshan et al. [DGL19] use a similar approach for the single item case, which falls short in
the general case. They capture all pertinent information about an auction in a single “profile” which
is then used to compute the revenue of the auction, and use these profiles to write an ILP. However,
we need exponentially many profiles to extend this approach to the general case, essentially because
we need information about all the winners in order to compute the auction’s revenue.
We proceed as follows. Instead of capturing all information about the winners in a single profile,
we partition this information into several sub-profiles, each containing only a single winner and the
supporting buyer. One complication is that these sub-profiles should not contradict each other
(e.g., having different supporting buyers). This issue gets even more complicated when we relax
the integrality constraint of the ILP. We resolve this by introducing new variables and constraints
to our LP.
Next, we use the optimal solution to the LP to construct two vectors of reserve prices which
we refer to as inflated reserves and discounted reserves. For each buyer b, we use the LP solution
to choose a threshold tb to determine if a reserve price is too high or too low. We construct two
probability distributions: one over reserve prices above tb, and another over reserve prices below
tb. We use these distributions to draw, resp., the inflated and discounted reserve prices.
Let us provide some intuition for why we choose these two different vectors of reserve prices.
Recall that each buyer pays the maximum of its reserve price and the VCG payment. Let us
partition the winners’ payments into two types: one is from winners who pay their reserve prices,
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and another is from those paying the VCG payment. Note that setting smaller reserve prices results
in clearing more bids, and thus a larger VCG payment. Roughly speaking, second-type revenue
from the discounted reserves should be larger than that of the inflated reserves, while the opposite
might hold for the first-type revenue. Intuitively, if most of the optimal revenue is from type-one
payments and high reserve prices (at least tb for each buyer b), then we expect the inflated reserves
to give us a high revenue. Otherwise, if the optimal revenue is a combination of type-one and type-
two payments from small reserve prices, we expect a high revenue from the discounted reserves.
But what if the type-two payments form a substantial portion of the revenue? This is where the
vector of all-zero reserve prices comes into play. The all-zero reserve prices obtain the maximum
possible revenue one can get from the type-two payments as all the bids are cleared in this case.
We analyze these three solutions simultaneously to lower bound the revenue of each solution as a
function of the other two. By exploiting structural properties of our problem and the LP, we reduce
the problem of finding the approximation factor to a complex non-linear optimization problem. This
reduction, and solving this optimization problem, are the most technically challenging parts of the
paper (see Section 5).
To further highlight the significance of rounding our fractional solutions in two different ways,
we investigate the performance of the rounding procedure by Derakhshan et al. which only outputs
a single integral solution. Roughly speaking, they directly use the fractional solution of the LP as
a probability distribution over the reserve prices, and for each buyer independently draw a reserve
price from that. We show that for a large number of items, this approach fails to beat the greedy
algorithm. More precisely, for any given constant 0 < , we construct an example for which the
solution obtained using this rounding procedure gets at most 0.5 +  fractional of the optimal
revenue. We describe this example in Section 6.
1.3 Further Related Work
Revenue maximization in multi-unit auctions is a fundamental problem in algorithmic game theory
and has received a lot of attention over the years. In a seminal work, Myerson describes the
game-theoretically optimal mechanism, equivalent to VCG with optimal reserve, for one item when
buyers’ valuations are drawn from known independent distributions. Myerson’s mechanism is hard
to directly put into practice [RS16, CLMN14, GLMN17] as these assumptions often fail to hold
in real-life applications. Further, even if they do hold, the optimal auction is still quite complex.
Therefore, the need to design simple yet efficient mechanisms has resulted in a significant body of
work [GLMN17, CLMN14, PLPV16, AB18, BFM12, BGL+18, DGL19].
One approach taken in design of simple and efficient mechanisms is adding reserve prices to
already known simple auctions such as VCG or the second price auction (which is the special case
of VCG in single-item environments.) [PLPV16, RW16, CHMS10]. Moreover, reserve prices are
widely used in practice and have been shown to be very important for obtaining a high revenue
[OS11, BGL+18, EOS07].
The posted-price mechanism is another well-studied auction in multi-unit environments [CHMS10,
ACK18], related to a line of work on prophet inequalities [CSZ19, CFPV17]. For the case of in-
dependent buyer valuations, this mechanism has a particularly strong performance guarantee for
large numbers of items [Yan11, BGL+18]. To the best of our knowledge, the multi-unit posted-price
mechanism has not been studied for correlated buyers.
4
2 Preliminaries and Problem Statement
There are k identical items and n unit-demand buyers participating in a set of eager VCG auctions.
Let A and B respectively be the set of auctions and buyers. We are given a dataset of bids β where
for any auction a ∈ A and buyer b ∈ B, βa,b represents bid of buyer b in auction a. Let rb be the
personalized reserve price of buyer b. Then, given the bid vector βa for auction a and reserve price
vector r, the eager VCG auction (EVCG) works as follows.
1. Any buyer b with βa,b < rb is eliminated. Let Sa = {b : βa,b ≥ rb} be the set of buyers who
clear their reserve prices in auction a.
2. An item is allocated to a buyer b if there are at most k− 1 buyers in Sa whose bid is greater
than βa,b.
3. Pick the supporting buyer bs to be a buyer in set Sa such that there are exactly k buyers in
Sa whose bid in auction a is greater than βa,bs .
4 (βa,bs is the VCG payment of any winner.)
4. Any buyer b who receives an item is charged max (rb, βa,bs), otherwise they are not charged.
Given the dataset of bids β, our goal is to find a vector of personalized reserve prices that
maximize revenue of the auctioneer. Note that the reserve prices are the same across all the
auctions a ∈ A. However, each buyer b is assigned a personalized reserve price rb. We assume,
w.l.o.g. that the optimal reserve price for any buyer is equal to one of their submitted bids. Let
R = {βa,b : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}. Formally, we would like to solve the following optimization problem:
EVCG? = max
r∈Rn
Rev(r), where Rev(r) :=
∑
a∈A Reva(r)
and Reva(r) is the total payment in action a given the vector of reserve prices r. Note that to solve
this problem we face a search space of size |R|n which is exponential in the input size.
3 The Algorithm
In this section we provide an LP-based algorithm for finding a vector of personalized reserve prices
given a dataset of bids. We observe that to be able to describe the optimal solution of the problem
using polynomially many linear constraints, we need a concise representation of the solution space.
In Section 3.1, we explain this representation. In Section 3.2, we use this representation to design
an LP and prove that its objective function in its optimal solution is an upper bound for the revenue
of the optimal solution of the problem. Finally, in Section 3.3, we provide our rounding procedure
that uses the optimal solution of the LP and outputs a vector of reserve prices.
3.1 An Alternative Solution Space
In this section, our goal is to give a concise representation of the solution space which will help us
to write our linear program. We need this representation to have a polynomial size and it should be
possible to compute its revenue using a linear function. As mentioned before, we base our design
on the observation that to compute the revenue of an auction we do not need to have the reserve
price of all the buyers. Rather, it only suffices to know the reserve prices of the winners and bid
of the supporting buyer. The main idea here is to have variables that capture the outcome of
4As usual, we assume that no two buyers have the same bids, or we can break ties based on their IDs.
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auctions (i.e., who the winners and the supporting buyer are and their reserve prices.) instead of
just having variables for reserve price of buyers. We will define valid profiles and valid sub-profiles
of an auction to capture its outcome. Roughly speaking, the revenue obtained from each auction
can be computed in a linear way based on its outcome; thus the overall revenue can also be written
as a linear function which is sum of the revenue across all these auction.
Definition 3.1 (Valid Profiles). We define the set of valid profiles of an auction a as the set Pa
consisting of all tuples (b1, . . . , bk+1, r1, . . . , rk+1) ∈ Bk+1×Rk+1 that satisfy the following conditions:
1. For any i, j ∈ [k + 1] where i < j, bid of buyer bi is greater than or equal to that of buyer bj
in auction a; that is, βa,bi ≥ βa,bj .
2. For any i ∈ [k + 1] buyer bi clears his reserve, ri, in auction a; that is, βa,bi ≥ ri.
Valid profiles are defined to capture the outcome of an auction given a set of reserve prices.
However, note that each profile consists of at least k+ 1 buyers; thus, to be able to capture all the
possible scenarios (for example when fewer than k + 1 buyers clear their reserves in an auction),
we add k + 1 auxiliary buyers bˆ1 . . . bˆk+1 to B who bid zero in all the auctions. Also, w.l.o.g., we
assume that their reserves are always set to zero as well.
As mentioned previously, Derakhshan et al. [DGL19], use a concept similar to valid profiles to
write their linear program for k = 1. In their LP, there is a variable for any pair of auction and valid
profile. However, it does not work for us since it results in having exponentially many variables.
To overcome this, we define valid sub-profiles of an auction that only contains information about a
single winner and the supporting buyer as defined below.
Definition 3.2 (Sub-profiles). We define the set of valid Sub-profiles of an auction a as the set Sa
consisting of all tuples (b1, b2, r1, r2) ∈ B2 × R2 that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Bid of buyer b1 is greater than or equal to that of buyer b2 in auction a; that is, βa,b1 ≥ βa,b2.
2. Buyers b1 and b2 clear their reserves in auction a if reserve prices r1 and r2 are set for them
respectively; that is, βa,b1 ≥ r1 and βa,b2 ≥ r2.
For any given p = (b1, b2, r1, r2) ∈ Sa, we have Reva(p) := max(βa,b2 , r1).
Given a vector of reserve prices r′, we say a sub-profile (b1, b2, r1, r2) ∈ Sa happens in auction
a after applying r′, iff r′b1 = r1, r
′
b2
= r2, buyer b1 is a winner in auction a and buyer b2 is the
supporting buyer in this auction. Moreover, we say two sub-profiles (b1, b2, r1, r2) and (b
′
1, b
′
2, r
′
1, r
′
2)
are compatible iff b′2 = b2 and r′2 = r2 which means that they have the same information about
the supporting buyer. Moreover, we say a set P of valid sub-profiles are compatible iff they are
pairwise compatible and |P | = k. Since we have added k + 1 auxiliary buyers whose bid is always
cleared in all the auction, we can assume that we always have exactly k winners and a supporting
buyer.
To explain how a solution is represented using these sub-profiles, we consider a vector of reserve
prices r and construct its representation in this new solution space. For any auction a and any
sub-profile p ∈ Sa, we have a variable sa,p which is equal to one iff sub-profile p happens in auction
a after applying vector of reserve prices r. Otherwise we have sa,p = 0. We say vector s constructed
in this way is the representation of r in the profile space. As mentioned above, this representation
allows us to compute the revenue of each auction using a linear function. Recall that for any
sub-profile p = (b1, b2, r1, r2) we have Reva(p) := max(βa,b2 , r1), thus we can write
Reva(r) =
∑
p∈Sa sa,p · Reva(p).
This function is linear since we have polynomially many valid sub-profiles; thus, for any valid
sup-profile p we can simply compute Reva(p) in advance and treat it as a constant in the LP.
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3.2 The Linear Program
In this section we first design an integer linear program (ILP) then remove its integrality constraints
to get an LP. We start by introducing the variables of our ILP. We have four vectors of random
variables s, x, y and y′ as defined below.
1. For any auction a ∈ A and any sub-profile p ∈ Sa, we have a variable sa,p ∈ {0, 1} which
is equal to one iff sub-profile p happens in auction a. This set of variables should satisfy
constraint
∑
p∈Sa sa,p ≤ k as at most k sub-profiles can happen in an auction.
2. For any buyer b ∈ B and any reserve price r ∈ R we have a variable xb,r ∈ {0, 1}. Reserve
price r is assigned to buyer b iff xb,r = 1. For this type of variables we enforce the necessary
constraint
∑
r∈R xb,r = 1 in our LP since each buyer has exactly one reserve price.
3. For any buyer b ∈ B, any auction a and any reserve price r ∈ R, we have a variable yb,r,a ∈
{0, 1} that is equal to one iff buyer b is assigned a reserve price of r as a winner in auction a.
4. For any buyer b ∈ B, any auction a and any reserve price r ∈ R, we have a variable y′b,r,a ∈
{0, 1} that is equal to one iff buyer b is assigned a reserve price of r as the supporting buyer
in auction a.
Roughly speaking, the vector of variables x is used in the LP to ensure that in different auctions,
solution s does not assign different reserve prices to the same buyer. Moreover variables y and y′
are to ensure that the sub-profiles in an auction are compatible with each other.
To be able to write the constraints of our LP, we first need the following definitions. Let
Qb,a := {(b, b2, r1, r2) ∈ Sa |b2 ∈ B, r1 ∈ R, r2 ∈ R} denote the set of valid sup-profiles of auction
a in which buyer b is the winner and Q′b,a = {(b1, b, r1, r2) ∈ Sa |b1 ∈ B, r1 ∈ R, r2 ∈ R} is the set
of valid sub-profiles of auction a in which buyer b is the supporting buyer. Moreover, let us define
Qb,r,a := {(b, b2, r, r2) ∈ Qb,a|b2 ∈ B, r2 ∈ R} and Q′b,r,a := {(b1, b, r1, r) ∈ Q′b,a|b1 ∈ B, r1 ∈ R}.
We are now ready to write our LP (ILP without the integrality constraints) which we present in
Figure 1.
In the rest of the paper we use s? to refer to s from an optimal solution of the LP. To be able
to use the optimal solution of the LP as a benchmark in analyzing the approximation-factor of our
algorithm, we need to show that it is indeed an upper bound for the optimal integral solution.
Lemma 3.3. The optimal revenue is upper bounded by
∑
a∈A
∑
p∈Sa s
?
a,p · Reva(p).
We have Section 8 designated to the formal proof of this lemma, and also give an informal
overview of that here. Roughly speaking, to prove this lemma, it suffices to show that the constraints
of the LP are all necessary for the consistency of the variables that we have defined. Below we give
some intuition about each constraint and why it is necessary.
Constraint (1) is due to the fact that for any auction a, buyer b, and reserve price r, variable
yb,r,a indicates whether or not buyer b has a reserve r and is a winner in auction a. This constraint
ensures that value of yb,r,a is consistent with whether or not there is a profile happening in auction
a in which buyer b is a winner as is assigned a reserve price of r. Constraint (2) is similar to the
previous one but for the supporting buyers. Constraint (3) is because the reserve prices assigned
to a buyer in different auctions should be consistent. Moreover, imposing constraint (4), on the
sub-profiles is to make sure that the sub-profiles that happen in an auction can form valid profiles.
Consider an auction a and buyers b1 and b2. The right-hand-side of this constraint is the probability
with which buyer b1 is the supporting buyer in auction a, and the left-hand-side is the probability
with which buyer b2 is a winner while buyer b1 is the supporting buyer which should obviously be
7
max
x,s
∑
a∈A
∑
p∈Sa
sa,p · Reva(p)
s.t. yb,r,a =
∑
p∈Qb,r,a
sa,p ∀a, b, r : b ∈ B, a ∈ A, r ∈ R (1)
y′b,r,a =
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a
sa,p
k
∀a, b, r : b ∈ B, a ∈ A, r ∈ R (2)
yb,r,a + y
′
b,r,a ≤ xb,r ∀a, b, r : b ∈ B, a ∈ A, r ∈ R, (3)∑
p∈Qb2,a
∩Q′b1,a
sa,p ≤
∑
r∈R
y′b1,r,a ∀a, b1, b2 : b, b2 ∈ B, a ∈ A (4)
∑
p∈Sa
sa,p ≤ k ∀a : a ∈ A (5)∑
r∈R
xb,r = 1 ∀b : b ∈ B (6)
sa,p ≥ 0 ∀a, p : a ∈ A, p ∈ Sa (7)
Figure 1: The Linear Program
smaller than the probability that buyer b2 is a supporting buyer. Finally, constraints (5), (6), and
(7) are by definition of variables. This LP upper bounds the optimal solution (the proof is deferred
to the appendix).
3.3 The LP-Rounding Procedure
In this section, given an optimal solution of the LP we generate an integral solution for the problem.
Input of the algorithm is the vector x from an optimal solution of the LP and a parameter β ∈ [0, 1],
which we fix later.
1. For any buyer b let tb be the maximum number in R that satisfies
∑
r<tb
xb,r ≤ β.
2. Define vectors f and f ′ as follows: For any r ∈ R where r < tb set fb,r := xb,r/β and f ′b,r := 0.
For any r > tb, set fb,r := 0 and f
′
b,r := xb,r/(1−β). Finally for r = tb, set fb,r := 1−
∑
r′<tb fb,r′
and f ′b,r := 1−
∑
r′>tb f
′
b,r′ .
3. Construct r the vector of discounted reserve prices as follows: For any buyer b independently
choose a random reserve price rb ∈ R such that for any ρ ∈ R, we have Pr[rb = ρ] = fb,ρ.
4. Construct r′ the vector of inflated reserve prices as follows: For any buyer b independently
choose a random reserve price r′b ∈ R such that for any ρ ∈ R we have Pr[r′b = ρ] = f ′b,ρ.
5. Let z be the vector of all zero reserve prices.
6. Between z, r and r′ return the one with higher revenue which is as follows:
arg max
ν∈{z,r,r′}
Rev(ν).
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In the rest of the paper we use r and r′ to respectively refer to the vector of discounted and inflated
reserve prices constructed in this algorithm.
Remark 3.4. For the sake of simplicity in the analysis, we assume w.l.o.g., that for any auction
a, tb satisfies
∑
r<tb
xb,r = β. This implies that for any r ∈ R, if r < tb we have Pr[rb = r] = xb,r/β
and Pr[r′b = r] = 0. Otherwise, if r ≥ tb, we have Pr[rb = r] = 0 and Pr[r′b = r] = xb,r/(1− β).
In the next section we show how we can use specific features of the three solutions z, r and r′
to get our desired approximation-factor.
4 Approximation Factor
In this section, we prove our main theorem by giving a lower bound for the revenue obtained from
the vector of reserve prices outputted by the rounding algorithm.
Let us start by giving some definitions that will be used throughout this section. Define β
(k+1)
a
to be the (k + 1)-th highest bid in any auction a. Note that this is different from the bid of the
supporting buyer in auction a as the supporting buyer has the (k+1)-th highest bid after removing
the buyers whose bid is not cleared. Moreover, given a threshold τ , let us denote by Wa(r, τ) the
number of winners in auction a whose payment is greater than or equal to τ using the vector of
reserve prices r. Similarly, Wa(r
′, τ) is the number of winners who pay at least τ using vector of
reserve prices r′ in auction a. Note that Wa(r, τ) and Wa(r′, τ) are both random variables.
The following lemma establishes sufficient conditions for the algorithm to output an approximate
solution. For any given auction a ∈ A and a real number τ ≥ 0, we define
Φa(τ) :=
∑
p:p∈Sa,
Reva(p)≥τ
s?a,p − (1− β)E[Wa(r′, τ)]− β E[Wa(r, τ)].
Lemma 4.1. Suppose there exist absolute constants β ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ (0, 1) such that,
Φa(τ) ≤ 0 if τ > β(k+1)a , and (1)
Φa(τ) ≤ kc if τ ≤ β(k+1)a (2)
for any auction a ∈ A. Then, the algorithm with parameter β outputs a 11+c -approximate solution.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary auction a. By integrating over τ in Φa(τ), we obtain:∫
(β
(k+1)
a ,∞)
Φa(τ) dτ +
∫
(0,β
(k+1)
a ]
Φa(τ) dτ ≤ kcβ(k+1)a .
By simplifying this we get∑
p∈Sa
sa,p · Reva(p)− (1− β)E[Reva(r′)]− β E[Reva(r)] ≤ kcβ(k+1)a . (3)
Recall that the output of our algorithm is the best of r, r′, and z where z is the vector of all-zero
reserve prices and its revenue is kβ
(k+1)
a since by applying that, the players in the k first positions
win the k items and pay bid of the buyer in the (k+1)-th position. Therefore, the expected revenue
achieved from the output of our algorithm is at least
µ := max
(
E[Rev(r)],E[Rev(r′)], k ·
∑
a∈A
β(k+1)a
)
.
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Based on Equation 3 we have
Rev(s?)− (1− β)µ− βµ− cµ ≤ 0.
where Rev(s?) :=
∑
a∈A
∑
p∈Sa s
?
a,p · Reva(p). This implies Rev(s?)− (1 + c)µ ≤ 0, and as a result
Rev(s?)
1 + c
≤ max
(
E[Rev(r)],E[Rev(r′)], kβ(k+1)a
)
.
Further by Lemma 3.3, we know that Rev(s?) is an upper bound for the revenue of the optimal
solution; thus by setting β = β′ in the rounding algorithm its output is at least a 11+c -approximate
solution.
Having, Lemma 4.1, it suffices to prove that Equation 1 always holds and find values for pa-
rameters β and c that satisfy Equation 2. We address the former in the following lemma, and the
latter in Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.2. For auction a and any τ > β
(k+1)
a we have∑
p:p∈Sa
Reva(p)≥τ
s?a,p − (1− β)E[Wa(r′, τ)]− β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ 0.
Proof. By definition of Wa(r
′, τ) and Wa(r, τ) for any τ > β
(k+1)
a , we have
(1−β)E [Wa(r′, τ)]+β E [Wa(r, τ)] = (1− β)E[min(∑
b∈B
1r′b>τ , k
)]
+β E
[
min
(∑
b∈B
1rb>τ , k
)]
.
Recall that β
(k+1)
a is defined in a way that there are exactly k buyers with bids greater than β
(k+1)
a
in auction a. As a result, there are at most k buyers for whom Pr[r′b > τ ] or Pr[rb > τ ] is nonzero.
This means that we can rewrite the inequality as
(1− β)E [Wa(r′, τ)]+ β E [Wa(r, τ)] = (1− β)E[∑
b∈B
1r′b>τ
]
+ β E
[∑
b∈B
1rb>τ
]
= E
[∑
b∈B
1rb>τ
]
.
Observe that, by construction of r and r′ we have
E[1rb>τ ] = Pr[rb > τ ] =
1
β
∑
r∈(τ,tb)
xb,r and E[1r′b>τ ] = Pr[r
′
b > τ ] =
1
1− β
∑
r:r≥tb,r>τ
xb,r. (4)
Moreover, by putting the first and third constraints of the LP together, for any buyer b and any
reserve price r > τ , we get
∑
p∈Qb,r,a s
?
a,p ≤ xb,r. Note that for any p = (b1, b2, r1, r2) ∈ Sa, by
definition, we have β
(k+1)
a ≥ βa,b2 , which means that if we have Reva(p) > τ , then Reva(p) = r1 and
p ∈ Qb1,r1,a. This results in the following equations.∑
b∈B
∑
r∈(τ,tb)
xb,r ≥
∑
p:p∈Sa,
Reva(p)<tb,
Reva(p)>τ
s?a,p, and
∑
b∈B
∑
r:r≥tb,
r>τ
xb,r ≥
∑
p:p∈Sa,
Reva(p)≥tb,
Reva(p)>τ
s?a,p.
Combining these with the equations in (4) gives us the following equation and concludes the proof.
(1− β)E [Wa(r′, τ)]+ β E [Wa(r, τ)] ≥ ∑
p:p∈Sa
Reva(p)>τ
s?a,p.
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The following lemma is the most technically challenging part of the paper. Therefore, we have
Section 5 (almost the rest of the paper) assigned to its proof.
Lemma 4.3. Setting β = 0.55 and c = 0.58, the following inequality holds for any auction a ∈ A
and any 0 < τ ≤ β(k+1)a .∑
p:p∈Sa,
Reva(p)≥τ
s?a,p − (1− β)E[Wa(r′, τ)]− β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ kc. (5)
We are now ready to prove the main result of the paper. Below we restate the main theorem
and prove it using the lemmas in this section.
Theorem 1. There exists an algorithm with running time polynomial in the input size that outputs
a vector of reserve prices ro such that Rev(ro) is at least a 0.63 fraction of the revenue achieved
from the optimal vector of reserve prices.
Proof. First, note that the LP designed in Section 3.2 has polynomially many variables and con-
straints. To design our algorithm, we first solve the LP, then given an optimal solution of that use
the LP-rounding procedure to output a vector of reserve prices. Since the LP rounding procedure
has a polynomial running time, the total running time of the algorithm is polynomial as well.
To analyze the approximation factor of the algorithm we use Lemma 4.1, Lemma 4.3 and
Lemma 4.2. The first lemma states that if there exists a constant c ≥ 0 and a valuation for
parameter β that satisfies Equation 1 for any τ > β
(k+1)
a , and satisfies Equation 2 for any τ ≤ β(k+1)a ,
then our rounding algorithm is a 11+c -approximation. In Lemma 4.3, we prove that Equation 1
holds for any β ∈ (0, 1) and any τ > β(k+1)a . Moreover, based on Lemma 4.2 we have that by
setting β = 0.55, Equation 2 holds for any τ ≤ β(k+1)a and c = 0.58. This implies that by setting
β = 0.55 in the rounding algorithm, its output is a 0.63-approximation of the optimal solution since
1
1+0.58 > 0.63.
5 Proof of Lemma 4.3
In this section, we will consider an arbitrary auction a ∈ A and any constant 0 < τ ≤ β(k+1)a , and
focus on finding a constant c and a valuation for β that satisfy∑
p:p∈Sa,
Reva(p)≥τ
s?a,p − (1− β)E[Wa(r′, τ)]− kc ≤ β E[Wa(r, τ)].
Denote by Ba,τ the set of buyers whose bid in auction a is greater than or equal to τ . Formally,
we have Ba,τ := {b ∈ B : βa,b ≥ τ}. Throughout this section, since we assume that a can be any
arbitrary auction from A, we will abbreviate all notations by dropping a for simplicity when clear
from the context. Let us define function F (s?, τ) as follows.
F (s?, τ) =
∑
p:p∈Sa,
Reva(p)≥τ
s?a,p − (1− β)E[Wa(r′, τ)] (6)
We will consider different values of F (s?, τ) as a function of β and give a lower bound for E[Wa(r, τ)]
based on that. Consider a buyer b ∈ Ba,τ . Let us define Bernoulli random variables pb,τ and qb
to be respectively equal to one iff rb ∈ [τ, βa,b] and equal to one iff rb ∈ [0, βa,b]. Moreover, let
Pτ =
∑
b∈Bτ pb,τ and Qτ =
∑
b∈Bτ qb.
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Claim 5.1. The expected revenue obtained from the vector of reserve prices r is as follows.
E[Wa(r, τ)] ≥ max
(
k.Pr[Qτ > k],E[min(Pτ , k)]
)
Proof. Note that Qτ is a random variable representing the number of buyers whose bid is cleared
and is greater than or equal to τ ; therefore, Qτ > k is the event in which at least k+ 1 buyers have
cleared their bid of at least τ which results in k items being sold with a price of at least τ . Moreover,
Pτ denotes the number of buyers whose bid is cleared with a reserve of at least τ ; thus, we sell at least
min(Pτ , k) of our items with a price of at least τ . This means that the expected number of items
that are sold with a price of at least τ is lower bounded by max(k.Pr[Qτ > k],E[min(Pτ , k)]).
Let Ta,τ be the set of sub-profiles in Sa whose revenue is at least τ . In the other words,
Ta,τ := {p ∈ Sa|Reva(p) ≥ τ}.
We partition Ta,τ to three disjoint subsets denoted by J +τ ,J −τ , and Lτ as follows. Set J +τ is the
set of sub-profiles in Tτ that capture the scenarios in which the supporting buyer has a bid smaller
than τ and the winner’s reserve price is greater than or equal to its threshold tb (defined in the
algorithm).
J +τ := {p = (b′, b, r′, r) ∈ Tτ | b /∈ Bτ and r′ ≥ tb′}.
We similarly define J −b,τ to be the set of sub-profiles in Tτ in which the supporting buyer has a bid
smaller than τ and the reserve price of the winner is below its threshold tb.
J −τ := {p = (b′, b, r′, r) ∈ Tτ | b /∈ Bτ and r′ < tb′}.
Moreover, Lτ defined below denotes the set of sub-profiles in Sa that capture the scenarios in which
the supporting buyer has a bid greater than or equal to τ .
Lτ := {p = (b′, b, r′, r) ∈ Tτ | b ∈ Bτ}.
Further, based on this set, we define
δτ :=
∑
b∈Bτ
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k. (7)
Observe that the defined subsets of Tτ satisfy Tτ = J +τ ∪ J −τ ∪ Lτ .
Given Claim 5.1, we now need to find a lower bound for max
(
k.Pr[Qτ > k],E[min(Pτ , k)]
)
as
a function of F (s?, τ) and δτ . To get this, we start by giving lower bounds for E[Qτ ] and E[Pτ ]
in the following section, then use the expected value of these random variables to bound the value
of the functions k.Pr[Qτ > k] and E[min(Pτ , k)] in Section 5.2. Note that all these bound will be
functions of F (s?, τ) and δτ .
5.1 lower bounds for E[Pτ ] and E[Qτ ]
In this section, we start by investigating useful facts about set Tτ , random variables p and q and
the relation between them which finally leads to lower bounds for E[Pτ ] and E[Qτ ]. Let us mention
that to prevent interruptions to the flow of the paper, proofs of some of the lemmas in this section
are deferred to Section 7.
We start by obtaining a lower bound for E[Pτ ], for which we make the three claims below.
Claim 5.2. The following holds:
∑
p∈Lτ s
?
a,p = kδτ .
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Proof. Recalling definition (7), it suffices to show
⋃
b∈Bτ (Lτ ∩Q′b) = Lτ , as it results in
δτ =
∑
b∈Lτ
s?a,p/k.
A valid sub-profile p = (b1, b2, r1, r2) is in
⋃
b∈Bτ Q′b iff b2 ∈ Bτ which also means Reva(p) =
max(r1, βa,b) ≥ τ and p ∈ Tτ . To complete the proof observe that this is indeed the definition of
set Lτ which is Lτ := {(b′, b, r′, r) ∈ Tτ | b ∈ Bτ} .
Claim 5.3. For any buyer b ∈ B we have
E[pb,τ ] ≥ 1
β
(
∑
p∈J−τ ∩Qb
s?a,p).
Proof. By construction, for vector of reserve prices r and any buyer b we have
E[pb,τ ] = Pr [rb ∈ [τ, βa,b]] =
∑
r∈[τ,βa,b]
fb,r,
where fb,r = xb,r/β for any r < tb as defined in the algorithm. This yields that
E[pb,τ ] ≥
∑
r:r<tb,
r∈[τ,βa,b]
xb,r
β
≥
∑
r:r<tb,
r∈[τ,βa,b]
∑
p∈Qb,r,a
sa,p
β
,
where the second inequality is by the first and third constraints of the LP. To complete the proof
it suffices to show that
(J −τ ∩Qb) ⊂
⋃
r:r<tb,
r∈[τ,βa,b]
Qb,r,a.
Observe that we have
(J −τ ∩Qb) = {(b, b2, r, r2) ∈ Tτ | r ∈ R, r2 ∈ R, b2 ∈ Bτ and r < tb} .
Moroever, note that for any sub-profile p = (b, b2, r, r2) ∈ Tτ we have Reva(p) = max(r, βa,b2) ≥ τ ,
thus if βa,b2 < τ then r ≥ τ . As a result we have
(J −τ ∩Qb) ⊂ {(b, b2, r, r2) ∈ Sa| r ∈ R, r2 ∈ R, b2 ∈ Bτ and r < tb} .
Further, since Qb,r,a := {(b, b2, r, r2) ∈ Sa|b2 ∈ B, r2 ∈ R}, then⋃
r:r<tb,
r∈[τ,βa,b]
Qb,r,a = {(b, b2, r, r2) ∈ Sa| r ∈ R, r2 ∈ R, b2 ∈ B, r ≥ τ, r ≥ βa,b, r < tb} .
Note that any (b, b2, r, r2) ∈ Sa satisfies r ≥ βa,b, therefore we get
(J −τ ∩Qb) ⊂
⋃
r:r<tb,
r∈[τ,βa,b]
Qb,r,a.
The following lemma is the last piece that we need to get the desired lower bound for E[Pτ ] in
Lemma 5.5. The proof of this lemma due to being lengthy is deferred to Section 7.
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Lemma 5.4. The following inequality holds.
F (s?, τ) ≤
∑
p∈J−τ
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ
s?a,p.
Lemma 5.5. We have the following lower bound for E[Pτ ] :
E[Pτ ] ≥ F (s
?, τ)− kδτ
β
.
Proof. Based on Lemma 5.4 we have
F (s?, τ)−
∑
p∈Lτ
s?a,p ≤
∑
p∈J−τ
s?a,p.
Combining this by
∑
p∈Lτ s
?
a,p = kδτ from Claim 5.2 and diving both sides by β gives us:
F (s?, τ)− kδτ
β
≤ 1
β
∑
p∈J−τ
s?a,p
We conclude the proof by noting that as a result of Claim 5.3, we have E[Pτ ] ≥ 1β
∑
p∈J−τ s
?
a,p.
Getting the desired lower bound for E[Qτ ] is however more complicated than that of E[Pτ ].
In Lemma 5.6 and Lemma 5.7 we give two different lower bounds for E[Qτ ] which we then merge
in Lemma 5.8 to obtain an stronger one. The proof of both these lemmas are based on careful
analysis of the relations between q and subsets of Tτ , and are deferred to Section 7 due to being
very complicated.
Lemma 5.6. For B1 = {b ∈ B : E[qb] = 1}, we have
E[Qτ − |B1|] ≥ (k − |B1|+ 1)δ/β.
Lemma 5.7. For B1 = {b ∈ B : E[qb] = 1} and m = |B1| we have
E[Qτ −m] ≥ F (s
?, τ)−mδ
β
+ δ/β.
Lemma 5.8. For B1 = {b ∈ B : qb,τ = 1}| and m = |B1|, we have
E[Qτ −m] ≥ k.max(F (s
?, τ)/k, δτ )− (m− 1)δτ
β
.
Proof. This is a direct result of the lower bounds given in Lemma 5.6 and Lemma 5.7, which are
respectively as follows.
E[Qτ −m] ≥ (k −m+ 1)δτ/β.
E[Qτ −m] ≥ F (s
?, τ)−mδτ
β
+ δτ/β.
By combining these lower bounds we get
β · E[Qτ −m] ≥ max(F (s?, τ), kδτ )− (m− 1)δτ ≥ k ·max(F (s?, τ)/k, δτ )− (m− 1)δτ .
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5.2 Revenue of the discounted vector
In this section, we continue our effort to give a lower bound for E[Wa(r, τ)] as a function of δτ and
F (s?, τ). Recall that by Claim 5.1 we have
E[Wa(r, τ)] ≥ max(k.Pr[Qτ > k],E[min(Pτ , k)]).
In Lemma 5.8 and Lemma 5.5 in the previous section, we have obtained lower bounds for both
E[Qτ ] and E[Pτ ] as functions of δτ and F (s?, τ). Thus, we proceed to find numeric lower bounds
for k · Pr[Qτ > k] and E[min(Pτ , k)] by all possible values of these parameters. To be able to
do so, we use the fact that both Qτ and Pτ are sums of Bernoulli random variables. Based on a
sequence of observations about Bernoulli random variables that are mostly presented in Section 9
we approximate Pr[Qτ > k] by a function on a set of Bernoulli random variables whose expectation
is related to E[Qτ ]. Later, we use the relation between Binomial and Poisson distributions to get
a lower bound that can be computed numerically given fixed values of δτ and F (s
?, τ). We take a
similar but simpler approach to find a lower bound for E[min(Pτ , k)].
Let us define function G(x, λ) for a real number τ > 0 and any integer x ≥ 0, as follows:
G(x, λ) = 1−
x∑
i=0
λie−λ
i!
. (8)
Note that G(x, λ) is the probability with which a random variable drawn from Pois(λ) is greater
than x. This function later arises in the lower bound for Pr[Qτ > k] due to the special relation
between Poisson and Binomial distribution when the number of trials goes to infinity.
We start by the following lemma about Bernoulli random variables (proved in Section 9).
Lemma 5.9. Given m ∈ N and a random variable X that is sum of a set of independent Bernoulli
random variables with E[X] = µ, if m+ 1 < µ, then we have
Pr [X > m] ≥ min
0≤i≤m
G(m− i, µ− i).
For any 0 ≤ i ≤ k, let us define λi as follows. We have
λ0 = min
(
2F (s?, τ)
kβ
+ δτ/β − 2, F (s
?, τ)
kβ
)
,
λ1 = min
(
2F (s?, τ)
kβ
+ δτ/β − 1, 2F (s
?, τ)
kβ
)
,
and for any any i ≥ 2,
λi =
iF (s?, τ)
kβ
+ δτ/β.
We are not ready to state our lemma about a lower bound for F (s
?,τ)
kβ .
Lemma 5.10. If we have F (s
?,τ)
kβ > 1 and λi ≥ i+ 1 for any i ≥ 0, then
Pr[Qτ > k] ≥ min
0≤m≤k
G(m,λm).
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Proof. Let us define B1 = {b ∈ B : qb = 1}, m = |B1|, and Qτ,2 =
∑
b∈B\B1 qb. We have E[Qτ ] =
E[Qτ,2] +m which implies Pr[Qτ > k] = Pr[Qτ,2 > k−m]. Using Lemma 5.8, we have the following
lower bound for the expected value of random variable Qτ,2:
E[Qτ,2] ≥ k.max(F (s
?, τ)/k, δτ )− (m− 1)δτ
β
. (9)
Further, since Qτ,2 is sum of a set of independent Bernoulli random variables, if E[Qτ,2] ≥ k−m+1
holds, as an application of Lemma 5.9, we get
Pr[Qτ,2 > (k −m)] ≥ min
0≤i≤k1
G(k1 − i,E[Qτ,2]− i),
where k1 = k −m. We will later prove that E[Qτ,2] ≥ k −m + 1 holds. Given this equation, to
complete the proof it suffices to show that for any 0 ≤ i ≤ k1, we have G(k1 − i, E[Qτ,2] − i) ≥
G(k1 − i, λk1−i) since 0 ≤ k1 − i ≤ k. We do this by proving that the following equation holds for
any 0 ≤ i ≤ k1:
E[Qτ,2]− i ≥ λk1−i.
Note that proving this also gives us E[Qτ,2] ≥ k −m + 1 since we get E[Qτ,2] ≥ λk−m and by the
statement of the lemma, we have λk−m ≥ k − m + 1. Recall that by definition, for any i with
k1 − i ≥ 1 we have
λk1−i =
(k1 − i)F (s?, τ)
kβ
+ δτ/β.
Moreover, using the lower bound provided for E[Qτ,2] in Equation 9, we get
E[Qτ,2] ≥ k.max(F (s
?, τ)/k, δτ )− (m− 1)δτ
β
≥ (k −m).F (s
?, τ)/k + δτ
β
≥ k1F (s
?, τ)
kβ
+ δτ/β.
We complete the proof for the case of k1 − i > 1 by invoking F (s
?,τ)
kβ > 1 from the statement of
lemma. Therefore, to complete the proof it suffices to show that E[Qτ,2] − i ≥ λk1−i holds for
k1 − i ≤ 1. Using Equation 9 and by the fact that k ≥ 2, we have
E[Qτ,2] ≥ k.max(F (s
?, τ)/k, δτ )−mδτ + δτ
β
≥ 2F (s
?, τ)/k + (k − 2−m) max(F (s?, τ)/k, δτ ) + δτ
β
.
If m = 0, then we have k1 − 2 = k − 2−m ≥ 0. Moreover, since we have F (s?, τ)/(kβ) > 1, in the
case of m = 0, we get
E[Qτ,2]− i ≥ 2F (s
?, τ)/k + δτ + (k1 − 2) max(F (s?, τ)/k, δτ )
β
− i ≥ 2F (s
?, τ)/k + δτ
β
+ k1 − 2− i.
This implies E[Qτ,2]− i ≥ λk1−i for m = 0 and k1 − i ≤ 1. Now, it remains to show this for m > 0
and k1 − i ≤ 1 as well. If m > 0 we can write the followings:
E[Qτ,2] ≥ k.max(F (s
?, τ)/k, δτ )− (m− 1)δτ
β
≥ (k −m+ 1)F (s
?, τ)/k
β
=
(k1 + 1)F (s
?, τ)/k
β
,
E[Qτ,2]− i ≥ (k1 − i+ 1)F (s
?, τ)/k + i · F (s?, τ)/k
β
− i ≥ (k1 − i+ 1)F (s
?, τ)/k
β
.
As a result of this for the cases of (k1 − i) = 0 and (k1 − i) = 1 we respectively get E[Qτ,2] −
i ≥ F (s?, τ)/(kβ) and E[Qτ,2] − i ≥ 2F (s?, τ)/(kβ). Knowing that by definition, we have λ0 ≤
F (s?, τ)/(kβ) and λ1 ≤ 2F (s?, τ)/(kβ) hold completes the proof.
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Based on a simple application of Chernoff bound, we show that for any m ≥ 2000, we have
G(m, 1.05m) ≥ 0.9. (We will prove this as Lemma 9.5 in Section 9.) Since λm is an increasing
function of F (s?, τ)/(kβ), and that λm ≥ mF (s?, τ) holds for any m ≥ 2, this implies that for
F (s?, τ)/(kβ) ≥ 1.05, and m ≥ 2000 we have G(m,λm) ≥ 0.9. This gives us
Pr[Qτ > k] ≥ min(0.9, min
0≤m<2000
G(m,λm)). (10)
For smaller values of m; however, giving a desired lower bound for G(m,λm) is unnecessarily
complicated. To avoid the complication of that proof, we instead numerically compute G(m,λτ )
for different values of F (s?, τ)/(kβ) and δτ/β in Table 1. Then, using Lemma 5.10 find a lower
bound for Pr[Qτ > k] given fixed values for these variables. Each element of Table 1, contains value
of min0≤m<2000G(m,λm) for fixed values of F (s?, τ)/(kβ) and δτ/β. Note that, we ignore an entry
of the table by inserting an −, if the values associated to F (s?, τ) and δτ/β in that entry do not
satisfy the necessary conditions of Lemma 5.10. We later use this table to complete the proof of
Lemma 4.3.
PPPPPPPPP
F (s?,τ)
kβ
δτ/β
0.6 0.8 0.9 1
1.05 - - 0.57 0.59
1.1 - 0.57 0.59 0.62
1.2 0.57 0.62 0.64 0.66
1.5 0.697 0.73 0.746 0.76
1.7 0.76 0.789 0.8 0.814
1.8 0.789 0.8 0.826 0.834
Table 1: lower bounds for Pr[Qτ > k] given fixed values of F (s
?, τ) and δ/β based on Equation 10.
To be able to use the information in this table towards giving a numeric lower bound for
max(Pr[Qτ > k],E[min(Qτ , k)]/k), we also need a similar table for E[min(Pτ , k)]/k. To provide the
desired lower bound for E[min(Pτ , k)]/k in Lemma 5.13, we first need some facts about Bernoulli
random variables which are stated in Lemma 5.11 and Claim 5.12 below. To prevent interruptions
to the flow of this section, both proofs are deferred to Section 9.
Lemma 5.11. For any integer number m > 2 and any real number θ ∈ [0, 2], we have
min
µ∈M2,θ
H(2,µ) ≤ min
µ∈Mm,θ
H(m,µ),
where Mm,θ = {µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ [0, 1]n|
∑n
i=1 µi = mθ}, and
H (k, (µ1, . . . , µn)) =
E[min(
∑
i∈[n] xi,m)]
m
,
with xi, . . . , xn being independent Bernoulli random variables with means µi, . . . , µn.
Claim 5.12. Given a fixed real number θ ∈ (0, 2), and a set of independent Bernoulli random
variables x1, . . . , xn with E[
∑
i∈[n] xi] = 2θ we have
1
2 E[min(
∑
i∈[n]
xi, 2)] ≥ 1− (1 + θ)e−2θ.
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Lemma 5.13. For any k > 1, we have
E[min(Pτ , k)]/k > 1− (1 + α)e−2α, where α = F (s?, τ)/(kβ)− δ/β. (11)
Proof. For any real number θ ∈ [0, 2] we define set
Mk,θ = {µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ [0, 1]n|
n∑
i=1
µi ≥ kθ},
and function
H(k, (µ1, . . . , µn)) =
E[min(
∑
i∈[n] xi, k)]
k
,
where xi, . . . , xn are independent Bernoulli random variables with means µi, . . . , µn. By Lemma 5.11,
we know that
min
µ∈M2,θ
H(2,µ) ≤ min
µ∈Mk,θ
H(k,µ).
Note that we have (E[p1], . . .E[pn]) ∈Mk,α since based on Lemma 5.5
E[Pτ ] ≥ F (s
?, τ)− kδ
β
= αk.
Moreover, observe that H(k, (E[p1], . . .E[pn])) = E[min(Pτ , k)]/k, which implies
E[min(Pτ , k)]/k > min
µ∈M2,α
G(2,µ).
We complete the proof using Lemma 5.12 that states minµ∈M2,α H(2,µ) ≥ 1− (1 + α)e−2α.
We now proceed to construct a similar table for E[min(Pτ , k)]/k based on the lower bound
provided in Lemma 5.13. Each element of Table 2 contains a lower bound for E[min(Pτ , k)]/k,
given fixed values of m(s?, τ)/(kβ) and δτ/β.
F (s?, τ)/(kβ)− δτ/β 0.15 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2
E[min(Pτ , k)]/k 0.14 0.19 0.51 0.58 0.63 0.68 0.72 0.76 0.8
Table 2: lower bounds for E[min(Pτ , k)]/k based on different values of α := F (s?, τ)/(βk) − δ/β.
We use the lower bound E[min(Pτ , k)]/k > 1− (1 + α)e−2α obtained in Lemma 5.13.
The following lemma is the final piece that we need to complete the proof of Lemma 4.3. In this
lemma, we use the constructed tables to show that by setting β = 0.55 in the rounding algorithm
we get
F (s?, τ)− β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ 1.05kβ ≤ 0.58.
Lemma 5.14. For β = 0.55 we have F (s?, τ)− β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ 1.05kβ.
Proof. We start by considering different values of F (s?, τ) and finding a lower bound for E[Wa(r, τ)]
based on that. Recall that by Claim 5.1, we have
E[Wa(r, τ)]/k ≥ max
(
Pr[Qτ > k],E[min(Pτ , k)]/k
)
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Further, based on Lemma 5.10 and Lemma 5.13, we have
max
(
Pr[Qτ > k],E[min(Pτ , k)]/k
) ≥ max( min
0≤m≤k
G(m,λm), 1− (1 + α)−2α
)
,
where α := F (s?, τ)/(βk)−δτ/β. It is easy to see that min0≤m≤kG(m,λm) is an increasing function
of δτ/β, while 1− (1 +α)−2α is a decreasing function of δτ/β; therefore, for any x ∈ (0, 1) we have5
max(Pr[Qτ > k],E[min(Qτ , k)]/k) ≥ min
(
min
0≤m≤k
G(m,λm)| δτ
β
=x, (1− (1 + α)−2α)| δτ
β
=x
)
. (12)
We use this fact to construct Table 3 based on Table 1 and Table 2. To do so, for any fixed value
of F (s?, τ)/(kβ) = y, we consider four possible values x ∈ {0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 1} for δτ/β and rewrite
Equation 12 as
max(Pr[Qτ > k],E[min(Qτ , k)]/k)|F (s?,τ)/(kβ)=y
≥ max
x∈{0.6,0.8,0.9,1}
min
(
min
0≤m≤k
G(m,λm)|F (s?,τ)/(kβ)=y, δτ
β
=x, (1− (1 + α)−2α)|F (s?,τ)/(kβ)=y, δτ
β
=x
)
.
For any y ∈ {1.05, 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 1.7, 1.8} and x ∈ {0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 1}, we refer to Table 1 and Table 2 for
values of min0≤m≤kG(m,λm)|F (s?,τ)/(kβ)=y,δτ/β=x and (1−(1+α)−2α)|F (s?,τ)/(kβ)=y,δτ/β=x. (For the
sake of constructing this table, if for a pair of x and y, values of these function are not precomputed
in Table 1 and Table 2, we assume that they are equal to zero.)
F (s?, τ)/(kβ) 1.05 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.8
max(Pr[Qτ > k],E[min(Qτ , k)]/k) 0.14 0.19 0.51 0.68 0.76 0.789
Table 3: lower bounds for E[Wa(r, τ)]/k using Equation 12, given fixed values of F (s?, τ)/(kβ)
achieved from combining Table 1 and Table 2.
As an instance, the first column of the table is obtained as follows. For F (s?, τ)/(kβ) = 1.05
and δτ/β = 0.9, we have the followings respectively based on Table 1 and Table 2:
min
0≤m≤k
G(m,λm)|F (s?,τ)/(kβ)=1.05,δτ/β=0.9 = 0.57,(
1− (1 + α)−2α)|F (s?,τ)/(kβ)=1.05,δτ/β=0.9 = 0.14.
As a result, we have
max(Pr[Qτ > k],E[min(Qτ , k)]/k)|F (s?,τ)/(kβ)=1.05
≥ max
x∈{0.8,0.9,1}
min
(
min
0≤m≤k
G(m,λm)|F (s?,τ)/(kβ)=1.05, δτ
β
=0.9, (1− (1 + α)−2α)|F (s?,τ)/(kβ)=1.05, δτ
β
=0.9
)
≥ min(0.57, 0.14) = 0.14.
We now proceed to complete the proof using Table 3. Observe that the lower bound in Equa-
tion 12 is a non-decreasing function of F (s?, τ)/(kβ). This implies that for any 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1,
we have E[Wa(r, τ)|F (s
?,τ)
kβ = x] ≤ E[Wa(r, τ)|F (s
?,τ)
kβ ∈ [x, y]]. Having this, we complete the proof
using a case by case analysis and proving that
F (s?, τ)− β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ 1.05kβ
holds for all possible values of F (s?, τ)/(kβ).
5To clarify the notation, when we use G(a, b)|b=x, for a function G, we refer to the value of G given that b = y.
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• For F (s?, τ)/(kβ) ∈ [0, 1.05], it is obvious that F (s?, τ)− β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ 1.05kβ holds.
• If F (s?, τ)/(kβ) ∈ [1.05, 1.1], then we get F (s?, τ)− β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ (1.1− 0.14)kβ = 0.96kβ
since in this case we have E[Wa(r, τ)]/k ≥ 0.14 based on Table 3.
• If F (s?, τ)/(kβ) ∈ [1.1, 1.2], then we get F (s?, τ) − β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ (1.2 − 0.19)kβ = 1.01kβ
since in this case we have E[Wa(r, τ)]/k ≥ 0.19.
• If F (s?, τ)/(kβ) ∈ [1.2, 1.5], then we get F (s?, τ) − β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ (1.5 − 0.51)kβ = 0.99kβ
since in this case we have E[Wa(r, τ)]/k ≥ 0.51.
• If F (s?, τ)/(kβ) ∈ [1.5, 1.7], then we get F (s?, τ) − β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ (1.7 − 0.68)kβ = 1.02kβ
since in this case we have E[Wa(r, τ)]/k ≥ 0.68.
• If F (s?, τ)/(kβ) ∈ [1.7, 1.8], then we get F (s?, τ) − β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ (1.8 − 0.76)kβ = 1.04kβ
since in this case we have E[Wa(r, τ)]/k ≥ 0.76.
• If F (s?, τ)/(kβ) ∈ [1.8, 1/β], then we get F (s?, τ)− β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ (1.8− 0.76)kβ = 1.04kβ
since in this case we have E[Wa(r, τ)]/k ≥ 0.76.
The proof is concluded since we know F (s?, τ)/(kβ) ≤ 1/β. This is due to the definition of
F (s?, τ) which is
F (s?, τ) =
∑
p:p∈Sa,
Reva(p)≥τ
s?a,p − (1− β)E[Wa(r′, τ)],
and the fact that by constraints of the LP, we have
∑
p:p∈Sa s
?
a,p ≤ k.
6 Upper Bound for the “Simple Rounding” Approach
In the algorithm designed for the single unit case of the problem, Derakhshan et al. [DGL19] provide
a simple rounding technique which directly uses the fraction solution of the LP as a probability
distribution over reserve prices, and for each buyer independently draws a reserve price from that.
This is equivalent to setting β = 0 in our rounding algorithm. In the rest of the section, we use
simple rounding to refer to this rounding technique. We show using an example that for a large
enough k (number of items) the approximation factor of this algorithm is at most 0.5 +  for any
small constant .
Lemma 6.1. Given any constant  > 0, there exists a dataset of bids for which the simple rounding
approach achieves at most 0.5 +  fraction of the optimal revenue.
Proof. We use Table 4 to represent our dataset of auctions. Let k denote the number of items. In
our example, we have 2k+ 2 auctions and k+ 2 buyers represented by b1, . . . , bk+2. Each column in
the table represents an auction and its weight is the number of times that this auction is repeated in
the dataset. To put it differently, we can simply assume that there are only four weighted auctions
represented by the four columns and each one has a revenue equal to the total payment of buyers
in the auction multiplied by its weight. Further, note that buyers b3, . . . , bk+2 have similar bids in
all auctions.
20
XXXXXXXXXXXBuyer
Weight
1 1 k k
b1 k
3 0 0 0
b2 0 0 k 1
b3, . . . , bk+2 0 k
2 k 1
Table 4: A Bad Example
We observe that there are two different optimal vectors of reserve prices for this dataset which
are (k3, k, k2, . . . , k2) and (k3, 1, 1, . . . , 1). By applying the first reserves, the amounts of revenue
that we get from our four auctions (the four columns) are respectively k3, k3, k2, and 0, while
the second vector gives us k3, 0, k3, and k2 amounts of revenue respectively. Thus, the optimal
revenue adds up to 2k3 + k2. Further, let us mention that the all-zero vector of reserve prices
simply gives us a revenue of k3 + k2, and as a result the approximation factor of this solution is
at most 0.5 +  for a large enough k and any constant  > 0. Given a small constant  > 0, we
construct a fractional solution of the LP which if rounded using the simple rounding procedure,
results in a less than 0.5 +  approximate solution for large values of k. Let δ = /4, and consider a
solution of the LP that assigns δ probability to the first optimal solution and 1− δ probability to
the second one. A formal representation of this solution is given below. Note that for simplicity,
instead of sub-profiles, we use profiles to represent our solution. (See Definition 3.2.) Also, recall
that bˆ1, . . . , ˆbk+1 are the auxiliary buyers who bid 0 in all the auctions.
• sa1,p1 = 1 for p1 = (b1, bˆ1, . . . , bˆk, k3, 0, . . . , 0).
• sa2,p2 = δ for p2 = (b3, . . . , bk+2, bˆ1, , k2, . . . , k2, 0).
• sa2,p′2 = 1− δ for p′2 = (b3, . . . , bk+2, bˆ1, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
• sa3,p3 = δ for p3 = (b2, bˆ1, . . . , bˆk, k, 0, . . . , 0).
• sa3,p′3 = 1− δ for p′3 = (b2, b3, . . . , bk+2, 1, . . . , 1).
• sa4,p4 = 1− δ for p4 = (b2, b3, . . . , bk+2, 1, . . . , 1).
• sa4,p′4 = δ for p
′
4 = (bˆ1, b3, . . . , bˆk+1, 0, . . . , 0).
• xb1,k3 = 1.
• xb2,k = δ, and xb2,1 = 1− δ.
• xb,k2 = δ, and xb,1 = 1− δ for any b ∈ {b3, bk+2}.
It is easy to verify that this fractional solution satisfies the constraints of the LP and is an
optimal fractional solution; therefore, it suffices to show that the vector of reserve prices obtained
from the simple rounding algorithm gives us at most (0.5+)(2k3+k2) revenue for a large enough k.
As mentioned before, the simple rounding algorithm directly uses the fractional solution of the LP
as a probability distribution to randomly pick the reserve price of any buyer. More precisely, for any
buyer b any reserve price r is chosen with probability xb,r independently from other buyers. Let s
denote the vector of reserve prices obtained from rounding our fractional solution using this simple
rounding technique. Below we investigate the revenue obtained from each auction by applying s.
21
1. From the first auction we simply get revenue of k3 as reserve price k3 is chosen for buyer b1
with probability one.
2. In the second auction there are k buyers with nonzero bids, thus all the buyers get an item
and pay their reserve prices. This implies that the expected revenue of this auction is k(δk2+
(1 − δ)) since the simple rounding algorithm chooses reserve prices of k2 and 1 for buyers
b3, . . . , bk+2 with probabilities δ and (1− δ) respectively.
3. In the third auction, however, there are k + 1 buyers b2, . . . bk+2 with bid k; therefore, we
get a revenue of k3 if all the bids are cleared. Otherwise, revenue of this auction is the sum
of reserve prices of the buyers whose bid is cleared multiplied by the weight of the auction
(which is k). For any buyer b ∈ {b3, . . . bk+2} the simple rounding technique chooses reserve
price k2 with probability δ and reserve price 1 with probability 1 − δ. Moreover, buyer b2
gets reserve prices k and 1 respectively with probabilities δ and 1− δ. This implies that the
revenue obtained from this auction is k3 with probability (1− δ)k and it is less than 2k2 with
probability 1− (1− δ)k. Note that for any constant value of δ, we have limk→∞ (1− δ)k = 0;
thus, for a large enough k, the expected revenue obtained from this auction is at most 2k2+δ.
4. Since the maximum bid in the fourth auction is one and its weight is k, the total revenue
obtained from this auction is at most k2.
By summing up the revenue obtained from the four auctions, we conclude that for a large enough
k, the expected total revenue is upper bounded by (1 + δ)k3 + 3k2 + k. Since δ = /4, for a large
enough k we have (1+ δ)k3 +3k2 +k < (1+ /2)k3. Recall that the optimal vector of reserve prices
in this example gives us a revenue of 2k3 + k2. This implies that the approximation factor of the
simple rounding algorithm is upper bounded by 0.5 +  for a large enough k.
7 Omitted Proofs of Section 5.1
In this section, our goal is to prove Lemma 5.4, Lemma 5.6, and Lemma 5.7 which are stated in
Section 5.1. Before going into their proofs, however, we start by a series of claims that are needed
for completing the proofs.
Claim 7.1. If the following inequality holds, then E[Wa(r, τ)] = k.
E[Wa(r′, τ)] <
∑
b∈B
Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ] (13)
Proof. We have
E[Wa(r′, τ)] = min
(∑
b∈B
Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ], k
)
.
Define B′ = {b ∈ B : Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ] 6= 0}. Observe that if |B′| ≤ k then∑
b∈B
Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ] ≤ k,
which implies
E[Wa(r′, τ)] =
∑
b∈B
Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ].
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Thus, if Equation 13 holds then |B′| > k. By Claim 7.5, provided in the appendix, for any b ∈ B′
we have E[qb] = 1. This gives us Pr[
∑
b∈B′ qb > k] = 1 and as a result Pr[Qτ > k] = 1. Finally,
Claim 5.1 gives us E[Wa(r, τ)] ≥ kPr[Qτ > k], and concludes the proof.
Assumption 7.2. The following equation holds for any auction a ∈ A.
E[Wa(r′, τ)] =
∑
b∈B
Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ].
Proof. As a corollary of Claim 7.1, if
E[Wa(r′, τ)] ≤
∑
b∈B
Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ],
then Equation 5 is simply satisfied for β = 0.55 and c = 0.58 since in this case β E[Wa(r, τ)] = βk.
Moreover, based on LP we have ∑
p:p∈Pa
Reva(p)≥τ
s?a,p ≤ k,
which results in∑
p:p∈Pa
Reva(p)≥τ
s?a,p − (1− β)E[Wa(r′, τ)]− β E[Wa(r, τ)] ≤ (1− β)k = 0.45k < 0.58k.
Therefore, to complete the proof of Lemma 4.3, we make the following assumption and only focus
on proving Equation 5 for auctions that do not satisfy the mentioned condition.
Claim 7.3. For any buyer b ∈ Bτ the following holds.⋃
b1∈Bτ\{b}
(Qb,a ∩Q′b1,a) = Qb,a ∩ Lτ .
Proof. Consider a valid profile a valid sub-profile p = (b′, b′′, r′, r′′) ∈ Sa. By definition, for any
buyer b1 ∈ Bτ we have p ∈ (Qb,a ∩ Q′b1,a) iff b′ = b and b′′ = b1. Moreover, due to p being a valid
sub-profile, it satisfies b′ 6= b′′. As a result we have p ∈ ⋃b1∈Bτ\{b}(Qb,a ∩ Q′b1,a) iff b′ = b and
b′′ ∈ Bτ . This completes our proof since this is equal to definition of Qb,a ∩ Lτ .
Claim 7.4. For any buyer b ∈ Bτ we have∑
p∈Lτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k ≤ δτ .
Proof. As a constraint of the LP we have the following for b and any other buyer b1 ∈ B.∑
p∈Qb,a∩Q′b1,a
sa,p ≤
∑
r∈R
y′b1,r,a.
By summing both sides over all buyers in Bτ\{b} we get∑
b1∈Bτ\{b}
∑
p∈Qb,a
∩Q′b1,a
sa,p ≤
∑
b1∈Bτ\{b}
∑
r∈R
y′b1,r,a.
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Observe that by Claim 7.3 we have⋃
b1∈Bτ\{b}
(Qb,a ∩Q′b1,a) = Qb,a ∩ Lτ ,
which results in ∑
p∈Lτ∩Qb,a
sa,p ≤
∑
b1∈Bτ\{b}
∑
r∈R
y′b1,r,a. (14)
Moreover, as the second constraint of the LP we have
y′b,r,a =
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a
sa,p/k.
By summing up both sides of this equation over all reserve prices in R, we have∑
r∈R
y′b,r,a =
∑
r∈R
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a
sa,p/k −
∑
p∈Q′b,a
sa,p/k. (15)
Combining Equation 14 and Equation 15 yields∑
p∈Lτ∩Qb,a
sa,p ≤
∑
b1∈Bτ
∑
p∈Q′b1,a
sa,p/k −
∑
p∈Q′b,a
sa,p/k. (16)
We further use the fact that for any buyer b2 ∈ Bτ and any sup-profile p = (b′, b2, r′, r) ∈ Q′b2,a we
have p ∈ Lτ . Recall that Lτ is defined as
Lτ :=
{
(b′, b, r′, r) ∈ Tτ | b ∈ Bτ
}
.
We complete the proof using the definition of δτ which is δτ :=
∑
b∈Bτ
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b s
?
a,p/k. This gives
us the followings. ∑
p∈Lτ∩Qb,a
sa,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b,a
sa,p/k ≤
∑
b1∈Bτ
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b1,a
sa,p/k ≤ δτ . (17)
Claim 7.5. For any buyer b ∈ Bτ with Pr[r′b ≤ βa,b] 6= 0 we have E[qb] = 1.
Proof. By construction of r′ we have
Pr
[
βa,b ≥ r′b
]
=
∑
r:r≤βa,b,
r≥tb
xb,r/(1− β).
As a result, if Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b] 6= 0 then tb ≤ βa,b. Recall that by definition of tb, we have∑
r<tb
xb,r = β.
Further by construction of r we have
E[qb] = Pr [rb ≤ βa,b] =
∑
r:r≤βa,b,
r<tb
xb,r/β.
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Given that tb ≤ βa,b we get
E[qb] = Pr [rb ≤ βa,b] =
∑
r<tb
xb,r/β = 1.
This concludes our proof.
Claim 7.6.
(1− β)
∑
b∈B
Pr
[
βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ
] ≥∑
p∈J+τ
s?a,p.
Proof. By definition of r′
(1− β)
∑
b∈B
Pr
[
βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ
]
= (1− β)
∑
b∈B
∑
r:βa,b≤r,
r≤τ
fb,r = (1− β)
∑
b∈B
∑
r:r≥tb,
r∈[τ,βa,b]
xb,r
1− β =
∑
b∈B
∑
r:r≥tb,
r∈[τ,βa,b]
xb,r.
(18)
Recall definition J +τ := {p = (b, b′, r, r′) ∈ Tτ | b′ /∈ Bτ , r ≥ tb′}, for which we have
J +τ ⊂
{
p = (b, b′, r, r′) ∈ Sa| r ≥ τ , r ≥ tb
}
.
This is because combination of p ∈ Tτ and b′ /∈ Bτ implies that revenue of the sub-profile is greater
than or equal to τ while bid of the supporting buyer is smaller than τ which yields r ≥ τ . Moreover,
due to validity of any sub-profile in J +τ we have βa,b ≥ r. Using the first constraint of the LP, we
get ∑
p∈J+τ
s?a,p =
∑
b∈B
∑
p∈(J+τ
∩Qb,r)
s?a,p ≤
∑
b∈B
∑
r:r≥tb,
r∈[τ,βa,b]
yb,r,a.
Moreover, by the third constraint, we have∑
r:r≥tb,
r∈[τ,βa,b]
yb,r,a ≤
∑
r:r≥tb,
r∈[τ,βa,b]
xb,r.
Evoking Equation 18, we obtain∑
p∈J+τ
s?a,p ≤
∑
b∈B
∑
r:r≥tb,
r∈[τ,βa,b]
xb,r = (1− β)
∑
b∈B
Pr
[
βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ
]
;
thus, the proof is completed.
Claim 7.7. The following equation holds for any buyer b.∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb,a
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b,a
s?a,p/k − (1− β) Pr
[
βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ
] ≤ max(β, δτ ). (19)
Proof. We consider two cases of tb ≥ τ and tb < τ and prove the lemma for them seperately. We
show that if tb ≥ τ then the left hand side of Equation 19 is uppe bounded by β, and for the second
case we show that it is upper bounded by δτ . We have∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb,a
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b,a
s?a,p/k ≤
∑
p∈Qb,a
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Q′b,a
s?a,p/k =
∑
r≤βa,b
∑
p∈Qb,r,a
s?a,p +
∑
r≤βa,b
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a
s?a,p/k.
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The right hand side is due to the fact that any sub-profile in Qb,a or Q′b,a is a valid profile of
auction a which implies Qb,a =
⋃
r≤βa,b Q′b,r,a and Qb,a =
⋃
r≤βa,b Q′b,r,a. Moreover, based on the
first three constraints of the LP for any r ≤ βa,b we have
yb,r,a =
∑
p∈Qb,r,a
s?a,p, y
′
b,r,a =
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a
s?a,p,a/k, and y
′
b,r,a + yb,r,a ≤ xb,r.
which implies ∑
r≤βa,b
∑
p∈Qb,r,a
s?a,p +
∑
r≤βa,b
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a
s?a,p/k ≤
∑
r≤βa,b
yb,r,a +
∑
r≤βa,b
y′b,r,a ≤
∑
r≤βa,b
xb,r. (20)
Moreover, based on the construction of r′ we have
(1− β) Pr [βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ] = (1− β)∑
r∈[τ,βa,b]
f ′b,r = (1− β)
∑
r:r∈[τ,βa,b],
r≥tb
xb,r/(1− β). (21)
If tb ≥ τ , combining Equation 20 and Equation 21, gives us∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb,a
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b,a
s?a,p/k − (1− β) Pr
[
βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ
] ≤∑
r≤βa,b
xb,r −
∑
r∈[tb,βa,b]
xb,r =
∑
r<tb
xb,r.
By definition of tb, we have
∑
r<tb
xb,r = β, therefore our proof for the case of tb ≥ τ is completed
and in the rest of the proof we assume tb < τ . Recall definition
J −τ := {p = (b, b′, r, r′) ∈ Tτ |βa,b′ < τ and r < tb}.
It is easy to verify that if tb < τ then J −τ ∩Qb,a = ∅. Since Tτ is partitioned to disjoint sets of J +τ ,
J −τ , and Lτ we obtain. ∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p =
∑
p∈J+τ ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Qb
s?a,p.
In addition, by Claim 7.6, we have
(1− β) Pr [βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ] ≥∑
p∈J+τ ∩Qb
s?a,p,
which gives us ∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p − (1− β) Pr
[
βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ
] ≤∑
p∈Lτ∩Qb
s?a,p.
The proof is then completed using Claim 7.4 that shows∑
p∈Lτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k ≤ δτ
for any buyer b.
Claim 7.8. For any buyer b with βa,b ≥ τ we have
E[qb] ≥ min
 1
β
 ∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k − (1− β) Pr
[
βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ
] , 1

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Proof. We provide two different proofs for cases of tb ≤ βa,b and tb > βa,b. We claim that in the
first case, we have E[qb] = 1 and in the second case,
E[qb] ≥ 1
β
 ∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k − Pr
[
βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ
] .
By construction, for vector of reserve prices r and any buyer b we have
E[qb] = Pr
[
rb ≤ βa,b
]
=
∑
r≤βa,b
fb,r,
where fb,r = xb,r/β for any r < tb and fb,r = 0 for any r ≥ tb as defined in the algorithm. Note
that tb is chosen in a way that
∑
r<tb
xb,r = β. Thus, if tb ≤ βa,b we get
E[qb] =
∑
r≤βa,b
fb,r =
∑
r:r≤βa,b,
r<tb
xb,r/β =
∑
r<tb
xb,r/β = 1.
This completes the proof for the first case. Therefore, in the rest of the proof we focus on the case
of tb > βa,b. This gives us
E[qb] =
∑
r≤βa,b
fb,r =
∑
r:r≤βa,b,
r<tb
xb,r/β =
∑
r<βa,b
xb,r/β ≥
∑
r<βa,b
(
yb,r + y
′
b,r
)
/β,
where the right hand side is by constraint yb,r + y
′
b,r ≤ xb,r in the LP. Further by the first two
constraints of the LP we obtain
∑
r<βa,b
(
yb,r + y
′
b,r
)
=
∑
r<βa,b
 ∑
p∈Qb,r,a
sa,p +
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a
sa,p/k
 .
Note that we can drop the constraint r < βa,b from the right hand side of the equation since by
definition of valid sub-profiles it holds for any p in Qb,a or Q′b,a. This gives us
∑
r<βa,b
 ∑
p∈Qb,r,a
sa,p +
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a
sa,p/k
 = ∑
p∈Qb,a
sa,p +
∑
p∈Q′b,a
sa,p/k ≥
∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb,a
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b,a
s?a,p/k,
which completes our proof.
Lemma 5.4. (restated) The following inequality holds.
F (s?, τ) ≤
∑
p∈J−τ
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ
s?a,p.
Proof. Recall that by definition
F (s?, τ) =
∑
p∈Ta,τ
s?a,p − (1− β)E[Wa(r′, τ)].
Moreover, by Assumption 7.2,
E
[
Wa(r
′, τ)
]
=
∑
b∈B
Pr
[
βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ
]
.
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In addition based on Claim 7.6, we know
(1− β)
∑
b∈B
Pr
[
βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ
] ≥∑
p∈J+τ
s?a,p.
Considering that Tτ is partitioned to three disjoint sets of J +τ ,J −τ , and Lτ , by putting the mentioned
equations together, we get
F (s?, τ) =
∑
p∈Ta,τ
s?a,p − (1− β)E[Wa(r′, τ)] ≤
∑
p∈Ta,τ
s?a,p −
∑
p∈J+τ
s?a,p ≤
∑
p∈J−τ
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ
s?a,p.
Lemma 5.6. (restated) For B1 = {b ∈ B : E[qb] = 1}, we have
E[Qτ − |B1|] ≥ (k − |B1|+ 1)δ/β.
Proof. By construction of vector of reserve prices r and r′, for any buyer b we have∑
r≤βa,b
xr,b = β Pr[r ≤ βa,b] + (1− β) Pr[r ≤ βa,b].
Moreover, by the third constraint of the LP for any buyer b and reserve price r ∈ R, we have
yb,r,a + y
′
b,r,a ≤ xb,r, which implies∑
r≤βa,b
(
yb,r,a + y
′
b,r,a
)
= β Pr[r ≤ βa,b] + (1− β) Pr[r ≤ βa,b].
Combining this with the first two constraints of the LP, yb,r,a =
∑
p∈Qb,r,a sa,p and y
′
b,r,a =∑
p∈Q′b,r,a sa,p we get
∑
r≤βa,b
 ∑
p∈Qb,r,a
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a
s?a,p/k
 = β Pr[r ≤ βa,b] + (1− β) Pr[r ≤ βa,b].
By definition of Qb,r and Q′b,a we can write∑
p∈Qb,a
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Q′b,a
s?a,p/k = β Pr[r ≤ βa,b] + (1− β) Pr[r ≤ βa,b]
and ∑
p∈Qb,a∩Lτ
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Q′b,a∩Lτ
s?a,p/k ≤ β Pr[r ≤ βa,b] + (1− β) Pr[r ≤ βa,b].
Further, by Claim 7.4, for any buyer b we have∑
p∈Lτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k ≤ δτ .
which means
∑
b∈B
 ∑
p∈Qb,a∩Lτ
sa,p +
∑
p∈Q′b,a∩Lτ
s′a,p/k
− δτ |B1| ≤ ∑
b∈B\B1
β Pr[r ≤ βa,b] + (1− β) Pr[r ≤ βa,b].
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Further, by 7.5, we know Pr[r ≤ βa,b] = 0 holds for any b /∈ B1. This implies
∑
b∈B
 ∑
p∈Qb,a∩Lτ
sa,p +
∑
p∈Q′b,a∩Lτ
s′a,p/k
− δτ |B1| ≤ ∑
b∈B\B1
β Pr[r ≤ βa,b] =
∑
b∈B\B1
β E[qb].
To complete the proof, recall that we have defined δτ =
∑
b∈Bτ
∑
p∈Q′b,a∩Lτ s
?
a,p/k, and by Claim 5.2
we have ∑
b∈Bτ
∑
p∈Qb,a∩Lτ
s?a,p =
∑
p∈Lτ
s?a,p = kδτ .
This implies ∑
p∈Qb,a∩Lτ
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Q′b,a∩Lτ
s?a,p/k = (k + 1)δτ ,
(k + 1− |B1|)δτ ≤
∑
b∈B\B1
β E[qb] = β(E[Qτ ]− |B1|),
(k + 1− |B1|)δτ/β ≤ (E[Qτ ]− |B1|) ,
and concludes the proof.
Lemma 5.7. (restated) For B1 = {b ∈ B : E[qb] = 1} and m = |B1| we have
E[Qτ −m] ≥ F (s
?, τ)−mδ
β
+ δ/β.
Proof. Recall that by definition
F (s?, τ) =
∑
p∈Ta,τ
s?a,p − (1− β)E[Wa(r′, τ)].
Combining this with Asspmtion 7.2 gives us
F (s?, τ) =
∑
b∈B
 ∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p − (1− β) Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ]
 ,
which results in
F (s?, τ) + δ
β
=
1
β
∑
b∈B
 ∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k − (1− β) Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ]
 . (22)
Moreover, by Claim 7.8, for any buyer b, we have
E[qb] ≥ min
 1
β
 ∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k − (1− β) Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ]
 , 1
 ,
and by Claim 7.7 for any buyer b, we have∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k − (1− β) Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ] ≤ max(β, δτ ).
29
This implies that if δτ ≤ β, then for any buyer b we have
E[qb] ≥ 1
β
 ∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k − (1− β) Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ]
 ,
and
E[Qτ ] ≥ F (s
?, τ) + δ
β
.
This completes the proof for the case of δτ ≤ β; therefore, in the rest of the proof we assume δτ > β
which means for any buyer b,∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k − (1− β) Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ] ≤ δτ . (23)
Note that for any b ∈ B/B1 we have qb < 1 which means
E[qb] =
1
β
 ∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k − (1− β) Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ]
 .
Combining this with Equation 22, we obtain
E[Qτ−m] =
∑
b∈B/B1
E[qt] =
F (s?, τ) + δ
β
− 1
β
∑
b∈B1
 ∑
p∈Tτ∩Qb
s?a,p +
∑
p∈Lτ∩Q′b
s?a,p/k − (1− β) Pr[βa,b ≥ r′b ≥ τ ]
 .
Using Equation 23, we get the following which completes the proof
E[Qτ −m] =
∑
b∈B/B1
E[qt] ≥ F (s
?, τ) + δτ
β
− mδτ
β
=
F (s?, τ)−mδτ
β
+ δτ/β.
8 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Lemma 3.3. (restated) The optimal revenue is upper bounded by
∑
a∈A
∑
p∈Sa s
?
a,p · Reva(p).
Proof. Consider OPT, an optimal solution of the problem. To prove this claim, it suffices to
construct vectors so, xo, and yo in a way that setting s = so, y = yo and x = xo in the LP satisfies
all the LP constraints and that the objective function of the LP equals to the revenue of OPT, or
in the other words
Rev(OPT) = max
x,s
∑
a∈A
∑
p∈Pa
soa,p · Reva(p). (24)
Roughly speaking, we construct so to be the representation of OPT in the profile space. For any
sub-profile p = (b1, b2, r1, r2) we have s
o
a,p = 1 iff using OPT, in auction a buyer b1 is one of the
winners, buyer b2 is the supporting buyer, and their reserve prices are respectively r1 and r2.
We first show that Equation 24 holds for so. Let r denote the vector of reserve prices in OPT.
For any auction a ∈ A, let bs,a be the supporting buyer, and let Ba denote the set of winners
in auction a using vector of reserve prices r. Payment of any winner b ∈ Ba in auction a is
30
max(rb, βa,bs,a), which means revenue obtained from auction a using the vector of reserve prices r
is
∑
b∈Ba max(rb, βa,bs,a). To prove Equation 24, it suffices to show that for any auction a we have∑
b∈Ba
max(rb, βa,bs,a) =
∑
p∈Pa
Reva(p).
Note that for any profile p = (b, r′1, b2, r′2) ∈ Pa we have sa,p = 1 iff b ∈ Ba, b2 = bs,a, rb = r′1 and
rb2 = r
′
2. Moreover, by defintion, we have Reva(p) = max(r
′
1, βa,b2) = max(rb, βa,bs,a). This implies
that ∑
p∈Pa
Reva(p) = max(rb, βa,bs,a),
which results in Equation 24.
To complete the proof we construct xo, yo, and y′o in a way that setting x = xo, y′ = y′o,
y = y′o and s = so, satisfied all the constraints of the LP.
• For any buyer b ∈ B and r ∈ R we set xob,r = 1 iff reserve price r is assigned to buyer b in
OPT and set xob,r = 0 otherwise.
• For any buyer b ∈ B, auction a ∈ A, and reserve price r ∈ R we set yob,r,a = 1 iff using solution
OPT, buyer b is a winner in auction a and he is assigned a reserve price r. Otherwise we set
yob,r,a = 0.
• For any buyer b ∈ B, auction a ∈ A, and reserve price r ∈ R we set y′ob,r,a = 1 if using solution
OPT, buyer b is the supporting buyer in auction a and he is assigned a reserve price r.
Otherwise we set y′ob,r,a = 0.
We now start investigating the constraints of the LP one by one and verify that all seven constraints
hold for x = xo, y′ = y′o, y = y′o and s = so.
1. For the first constraint we need to show yob,r,a =
∑
p∈Qb,r,a s
o
a,p for any b ∈ B, r ∈ R, and a ∈ A.
It is easy to see that if b is not a winner in auction a then both sides of this equation are equal
to zero. To complete the proof we assume that b is a winner. Let b2 denote the supporting
buyer in auction a. Moreover, let r1 and r2 respectively denote the reserve prices assigned to
buyers b and b2 in OPT. We have y
o
b,r,a = 1 iff r = r1 and b is a winner in auction a. We also
show that
∑
p∈Qb,r,a s
o
a,p = 1 iff r = r1. Note that p = (b, r1, b2, r2) is the only sub-profiles in
Sa with soa,p = 1. Further, by definition Qb,r,a is a subset of Sa and contains the sub-profiles
in which buyer b is a winner in auction a, thus it contains p iff r = r1. This means that both
sides of the equation are equal to one if r = r1 and both are equal to zero otherwise.
2. For the second constraint, we need to show that y′ob,r,a =
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a s
o
a,p/k holds for any
b ∈ B, r ∈ R, and a ∈ A. Let b1 be the supporting buyer in auction a and let r1 be the reserve
price assigned to this buyer. By definition we have y′ob,r,a = 1 iff b = b1 and r = r1, and we
have y′ob,r,a = 1 otherwise. Therefore, for this constraint to be satisfied we need to show that∑
p∈Q′b,r,a s
o
a,p = k holds iff b = b1 and r = r1, and we have
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a s
o
a,p = 0 otherwise.
Let b2 denote one of the winners in auction a and let r2 be the reserve price assigned to this
buyer. By definition, for any profile p = (b2, r2, b1, r1) ∈ Sa we have soa,p = 1 iff b2 is a winner
in auction a and r1 is the reserve price assigned to him. Since we have assumed that each
auction has exactly k winners then we have
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a s
o
a,p = k iff b = b1 and r = r2, and we
have
∑
p∈Q′b,r,a s
o
a,p = 0 otherwise.
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3. To prove that our constructed solution satisfies the third constraint of the LP, we need to
show yob,r,a + y
′o
b,r,a ≤ xob,r for any b ∈ B, any reserve price r ∈ R and any auction a. Consider
a buyer b and let r1 be the reserve price assigned to this buyer in solution OPT. For any
r 6= r1 both sides of the equation are obviously zero. However, for r = r1 we have xob,r = 1.
Observe that in any auction a, we also have yob,r,a + y
′o
b,r,a ≤ 1 since b cannot be both a winner
and the supporting buyer in an auction.
4. For the fourth constraint, we need to show
∑
p∈Qb2,a∩Q′b1,a s
o
a,p ≤
∑
r∈R y
′o
b1,r,a
. For any sub-
profile p = (b3, r1, b4, r2) in Qb2,a ∩ Q′b1,a we have b4 = b2 and b3 = b1. Moreover, we have
sa,p = 1 iff r1 and r2 are respectively the reserve prices assigned to buyers b1 and b2, buyer b1
is a winner in auction a and buyer b2 is the supporting buyer in this auction. This implies that
the left hand side is equal to one iff b1 and b2 are respectively a winner and the supporting
buyer in auction a. Further, the right hand side is equal to one iff b1 is the supporting buyer
in auction a. This concludes that the fourth constraint is satisfied for so and y′o.
5. The condition
∑
p∈Pa s
o
a,p ≤ k is satisfied due to the assumption that we have k winners in all
auctions. Let b′ be the supporting buyer in auction a. For a sub-profile (b1, r1, b2, r2) ∈ Pa
we have sob,r = 1 iff b2 = b
′, b1 is a winner in auction a, and r1 and r2 are respectively the
reserve prices assigned to buyers b1 and b2. Given that we have exactly k winner and that
each buyer has a unique reserve price then,
∑
p∈Pa s
o
a,p ≤ k.
6. For this constraint, we need to show
∑
r∈R x
o
b,r = 1. This is true since for a reserve r we have
xob,r = 1 if reserve r is assigned to buyer b, and in OPT there is exactly one reserve price
assigned to each buyer.
7. The last constraint is simply satisfied since soa,p is either zero or one.
9 Useful Facts about Bernoulli Random Variables
Lemma 9.1. If Y ∼ Binomial(n, p), then for any m ≤ n we have Pr(Y ≥ m) = G(p), where
G(p) =
n!
(m− 1)!(n−m)!
∫ 1
1−p
tn−m(1− t)m−1dt.
Proof. Let us define H(p) := Pr(Y ≥ m). We have
H(p) =
n∑
j=m
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j .
By taking derivative of this function we get:
H ′(p) =
n∑
j=m
(
n
j
)
jpj−1(1− p)n−j −
n∑
j=m
(
n
j
)
(n− j)pj(1− p)n−j−1
= n
n∑
j=m
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
pj−1(1− p)n−j − n
n−1∑
j=m
(
n− 1
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j−1
= n
n−1∑
i=m−1
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− p)n−1−i − n
n−1∑
i=m
(
n− 1
i
)
pi(1− q)n−1−i
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= n
(
n− 1
m− 1
)
pm−1(1− p)n−m = G′(p).
The proof is completed as we also have G(0) = H(0) = 0.
Lemma 9.2. For any α > 1 and m > 0, Pr[X ≥ m] is minimized subject to X ∼ Binomial(n,mα/n)
when n→∞.
Proof. Let us define Xn ∼ Binomial(n,mα/n) and Xn+1 ∼ Binomial(n,mα/(n + 1)) We need to
show that Pr[Xn ≥ m] ≤ Pr[Xn+1 ≥ m]. decreasing function of n. Using Lemma 9.1, we have
Pr[Xn ≥ m] = n!(m−1)!(n−m)!G(n) where
G(n, α) =
n!
(m− 1)!(n−m)!
∫ 1
1−mα/n
tn−m(1− t)m−1dt.
We have
Pr[Xn+1 ≥ m]
Pr[Xn ≥ m] =
(n−m+ 1)G(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)G(n, α)
.
Define Dn,α = (n−m+1)G(n+1)−(n+1)G(n). To complete the proof it suffices to show Dn,α ≤ 1.
∂Dn,α
∂α
α(mα)−m(n+ 1)m−1
(
1− mα
n
)m−n
= Dn,α;1 :=
(
1− mα
n
)m−n(
1− mα
n+ 1
)n−m+1
− n−m+ 1
n
(
n+ 1
n
)m−1
.
Moreover, for any α ∈ (1, n/m),
∂Dn,α;1
∂α
=
(α− 1)m2nn−m(n+ 1−mα)n−m
(n+ 1)n−m+1(n−mα)n−m+1 > 0.
As a result, sign of Dn,α;1 can only change from − to + as α increases from 1 to n/m. So, ∂Dn,α∂α
has the same sign pattern. To get Dn,α ≤ 1, it suffices to show that Dn,0 ≤ 0 and Dn,n/m ≤ 0.
Since for α = 0, we have G(n, 0) = 0 for all n, we obviously have Dn,0 = 0 ≤ 0. We conclude
the proof by noting the following.
Dn,n/m = (n+ 1)G(n+ 1, n/m)− (n−m+ 1)G(n, n/m)
≤ (n+ 1)G(n+ 1, (n+ 1)/m)− (n−m+ 1)G(n, n/m)
= 1
/( n
m− 1
)
− 1
/( n
m− 1
)
= 0.
Lemma 9.3. Let p = (p0, . . . , pn) ∈ [0, 1]n be an extreme point of function Fm(p) defined below
subject to
∑
i∈[n] pi = t for a fixed t.
Fm(p) = Pr
[∑
i∈[n]
xi > m
]
,
where x1, . . . , xn are independent Bernoulli random variables with E[xi] = pi for any i ∈ [n]. The
following holds for any i, j ∈ [n]. If pi /∈ {0, 1} and pj /∈ {0, 1}, then pi = pj.
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Proof. We use proof by contradiction. If there does not exist such an extreme point, then let p be
an arbitrary extreme point with maximum up defined as below.
up = min
i∈U
(pi)
where U = {i : pi 6= 0}. W.l.o.g, let pi = up and pick a j ∈ [n] where pi < pj . To obtain a
contradiction, we show that if p is an extreme point, then it is possible to modify pi and pj without
changing other elements of p in a way that the values of pi + pj and Fm(p) are unchanged but pi
is increased. This gives us a contradiction since by repeating this process one can increase up.
Let X =
∑
l∈n xl and X
′ = X − xi − xj . We have
Fm(p) = Pr[X
′ > m] + Pr[X ′ = m] Pr[xi + xj > 0] + Pr[X ′ = m− 1] Pr[xi + xj = 2].
Define d = (pj − pi)/2 and s = (pi + pj)/2. We have Pr[xi + xj = 2] = (s+ d)(s− d) = s2− d2 and
Pr[xi + xj > 0] = d
2 + 2s− s2. Let
G(s, d) = Pr[X ′ = m](d2 + 2s− s2) + Pr[X ′ = m− 1](s2 − d2).
Therefore,
Fm(p) = Pr[X
′ > m] +G(s, d).
Note that ∂G∂d = 2d(Pr[X
′ = m] + Pr[X ′ = m− 1]). By the assumption that p is an extreme point,
pi /∈ {0, 1} and pj /∈ {0, 1} we obtain that Pr[X ′ = m] + Pr[X ′ = m − 1] = 0. This gives us the
freedom to change values of pi and pj and set pi = pj = s as it does not change the value of Fm(p).
Thus, we obtain a contradiction and the proof is completed.
Fact 9.4. Given n iid Bernoulli random variables x1, . . . , xn with E[xi] = p, if n → ∞, then for
any 0 ≤ j ≤ n we have
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
xi = j
]
=
e−np(np)j
j!
.
Proof. This is based on the relation between Poisson and Binomial distribution when n→∞.
Lemma 5.9. (restated) Given m ∈ N and a random variable X that is sum of a set of independent
Bernoulli random variables with E[X] = µ, if m+ 1 < µ, then we have
Pr [X > m] ≥ min
0≤i≤m
G(m− i, µ− i).
Proof. Let x1 . . . xn denote a set of independent Bernoulli random that minimize Pr[
∑n
i=1 xi > m]
subject to
∑n
i=1 xi = E[X]. By Lemma 9.3, we know that any two variables xi and xj that are not
deterministically zero or one are identical. Let I = {i ∈ [n] : E[xi] = 1}. Moreover, w.l.o.g., assume
none of the variables are deterministically zero. We have Pr [
∑n
i=1 xi > m] = Pr[
∑
i/∈M xi > m−|I|].
Further by Lemma 9.2, Pr[
∑n
i=1 xi > m] is minimized when n→∞, which using Fact 9.4, leads to
Pr
[∑
i/∈M
xi ≤ m− |I|
]
≤
m−|I|∑
j=0
(µ− |I|)je−(µ−|I|)
j!
.
Recall that we have
G(x, λ) = 1−
x∑
i=0
λie−λ
i!
.
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Note that if |I| > m, then Pr[∑ni=1 xi > m] = 1, thus by considering all possible values of 0 ≤ |I| ≤
m we get
Pr
[
n∑
i=0
xi ≥ m
]
≥ min
0≤i≤m
(
1−
m−i∑
i=0
(µ− i)je−(µ−i)
j!
)
= min
0≤i≤m
G(m− i, µ− i).
Lemma 5.11. (restated) For any integer number m > 2 and any real number θ ∈ [0, 2], we have
min
µ∈M2,θ
H(2,µ) ≤ min
µ∈Mm,θ
H(m,µ),
where Mm,θ = {µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ [0, 1]n|
∑n
i=1 µi = mθ}, and
H (k, (µ1, . . . , µn)) =
E[min(
∑
i∈[n] xi,m)]
m
,
with xi, . . . , xn being independent Bernoulli random variables with means µi, . . . , µn.
Proof. Given a θ ∈ [0, 1] and an arbitrary m ≥ 2, let x = (x1, . . . xn) be a vector of independent
Bernoulli random variables with means µ1, . . . , µn summing to mθ and let y = (y1, . . . yn) be a
vector of independent Bernoulli random variables with expectations m−1m µ1, . . . ,
m−1
m µn summing
up to (m− 1)θ. We will prove that for any such x and y we have
E
[
min(
∑n
i=1 xi,m)
m
]
≥ E
[
min(
∑n
i=1 yi,m− 1)
m− 1
]
. (25)
This shows that for a given m and θ,
min
p∈Mm,θ
H(m,p)
is an increasing function of m and as a result for any m we have
min
p∈M2,θ
H(2,p) ≤ min
p∈Mm,θ
H(m,p).
To achieve this, for any i, we couple xi with yi so that E[yi|xi = 0] = 0 and E[yi|xi = 1] = m−1m ,
and show that
E
[
K(
m− 1
m
xi, . . . ,
m− 1
m
xn)
]
≥ E [K(y1, . . . , yn)] , (26)
where K(z1, . . . , zn) = min(
∑n
i=1
zi
m−1 , 1). Note that the left hand side of Equation 26, is equal to
that of Equation 25 and similarly the right hand sides are equal too, thus proving the correctness of
Equation 26 would complete the proof. Let x¯ = be an arbitrary realization of the vector of random
variables x. We show that for any value of x¯ we have
E
[
K(
m− 1
m
xi, . . . ,
m− 1
m
xn)|x = x¯
]
≥ E [K(y1, . . . , yn)|x = x¯] . (27)
We know that if at least m elements of x¯ are equal to one, then the left hand side is equal to one
as well. Also, function K(.) is upper bounded by one thus, if
∑n
i=1 x¯i > m − 1, the Equation 27
holds. Otherwise, if at most m− 1 elements of x¯ are equal to one then we have
E
[
K(
m− 1
m
xi, . . . ,
m− 1
m
xn)|x = x¯,
n∑
i=1
x¯i ≤ m− 1
]
= min
(
n∑
i=1
x¯i
m
, 1
)
=
∑n
i=1 x¯i
m
.
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Recall that for any yi we have Pr[yi|xi = 0] = 0, which results in
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
yi ≤ m− 1|x = x¯,
n∑
i=1
x¯i ≤ m− 1
]
= 1.
This implies that
E
[
K(yi, . . . , yn)|x = x¯,
n∑
i=1
x¯i ≤ m− 1
]
= E
[
min
(
n∑
i=1
yi
m− 1 , 1
)]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
yi
m− 1
]
=
∑n
i=1 x¯i
m
,
which completes the proof as we showed that Equation 27 holds for all possible realizations of x.
Claim 5.12. (restated) Given a fixed real number θ ∈ (0, 2), and a set of independent Bernoulli
random variables x1, . . . , xn with E[
∑
i∈[n] xi] = 2θ we have
1
2 E[min(
∑
i∈[n]
xi, 2)] ≥ 1− (1 + θ)e−2θ.
Proof. Let X =
∑
i∈[n] xi. We have
E[min(X, 2)] = Pr[X = 1] + 2 Pr[X ≥ 2] = 2− Pr[X = 1]− 2 Pr[X = 0]
It is easy to verify that this function is minimized when variables x1, . . . , xn are iid and n→∞ in
which case, X is a Poisson random variable with λ = 2θ. For X ∼ Poisson(2θ) we have
Pr[X = 1] + 2 Pr[X = 0] = 2e−2θ + 2θ−2θ = (2 + 2θ)e−2θ,
which results in
E[min(X, 2)]
2
= 1− (1 + θ)e−2θ.
Lemma 9.5. Given a real number α > 1.05, an integer m ≥ 2000, and a set of independent
Bernoulli random variables xi, . . . , xn with E[X] ≥ αm we have
Pr[X ≥ m+ 1] ≥ 0.9,
where X =
∑n
i=1 xi.
Proof. Note that for any m ≥ 2000, we have 1.05m < 1.049(m+ 1); therefore, given that α ≥ 1.05
and m ≥ 2000 we obtain E[X] ≥ 1.049(m+ 1). By Chernoff bound, for any δ > 0, we have
Pr (X < (1− δ)E[X]) <
(
e−δ
(1− δ)1−δ
)E[X]
.
In our case, we are interested in giving an upper bound for Pr[X < m+ 1], which is
Pr [X < m+ 1] ≤ Pr
[
X <
1
1.049
E[X]
]
<
(
e−0.047
(1− 0.047)1−0.047
)2000∗1.05
< 0.1.
This gives us Pr[X ≥ m+ 1] > 0.9 and completes the proof.
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